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THE FORGOTTEN EMPLOYEE BENEFIT CRISIS:
MULTIEMPLOYER BENEFIT PLANS ON
THE BRINK
Paul M. Secunda*
This Article provides a first time look at the numerous challenges
facing multiemployer or Taft–Hartley benefit plans in the post-global re-
cession and health care reform world.  These plans have provided pen-
sion, health, and welfare benefits to union members of smaller employers
in itinerant industries for over sixty years and even today these plans
collectively have over 10 million participants in over 1,500 plans.
Multiemployer plans are increasingly mired in financial trouble and
are finding it more difficult to continue providing adequate retirement
and health benefits to their members.  Although they once represented
one of the great triumphs in American labor relations, these plans are
now becoming just another part of the growing employee benefits crisis
confronting the United States.
The purpose of this Article is to consider, and respond to, the vari-
ous financial, healthcare, and judicial challenges that threaten the ongo-
ing viability of these plans.  By addressing these challenges in a
systematic manner, this Article seeks to provide a more sustainable path
forward so that multiemployer benefit plans can continue to provide cru-
cial employee benefits to the next generation of union workers.
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INTRODUCTION
The benefits world was abuzz in 2007 when the “big three” Detroit
automakers—General Motors, Chrysler, and Ford—established volun-
tary employees’ beneficiary associations (VEBAs)1 to deal with the
growing amount of debt related to their legacy costs.2  VEBAs provide
payments of life, health, accident, or other similar benefits to members or
their beneficiaries.3  These tax-exempt trusts are able to remove immense
healthcare obligations from company balance sheets, while at the same
time ensuring retirees some level of benefit that might otherwise be lost
should the employer file for bankruptcy or renege on previous lifetime
1 “VEBA[s] allow[ ] an employer to reach an agreement with the applicable union to
fund a stand-alone, tax-exempt trust that assumes full responsibility for all future retiree health
benefits.” See Susan E. Cancelosi, VEBAs to the Rescue: Evaluating One Alternative for Pub-
lic Sector Retiree Health Benefits, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 879, 899 (2009) (citing Aaron
Bernstein, Can VEBAs Alleviate Retiree Health Care Problems?, 1 CAPITAL MATTERS: OCCA-
SIONAL PAPER SERIES 7 (Apr. 2008), http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/lwp/pensions/pub-
lications/occpapers/occasionalpapers_Ap9_fin2.pdf).
2 See Sholnn Freeman & Frank Ahrens, GM, Union Agree on Contract to End Strike;
Deal Seen as Model Across Industries, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2007, at A1 (“Under the new
contract, UAW retiree benefits will be paid out by a voluntary employees’ beneficiary associa-
tion (VEBA).”).  Legacy costs are: “[t]he costs involved with a company paying increased
healthcare fees and other benefit-related costs for its current employees and retired pension-
ers.” See Legacy Costs, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/legacycosts.asp
(last visited Mar. 4, 2011).
3 I.R.C. § 501(c)(9) (2006).
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healthcare promises.4  The hope was that these VEBAs would cap legacy
costs, especially employer liability for retiree medical benefits.5
But the need for VEBAs in the first place to help contain legacy
costs also sheds needed light on a related and much more troubling em-
ployee benefits issue that has been neglected for far too long.  The em-
ployee benefit plans that provide retiree, health, and other welfare
benefits to unionized workers and retirees are generally struggling to sur-
vive the current economic and regulatory environment in the United
States.  These multiemployer plans, also referred to as “Taft–Hartley”
plans, are collectively bargained6 and maintained by one or more em-
ployers, usually within the same or related industries.7  Although mul-
tiemployer plans may seem less relevant today, given lower union
density levels in America, there are in fact more than 10 million partici-
pants nationwide in over 1,500 multiemployer plans.8
Part of the problem is that these plans are increasingly mired in
financial trouble and are finding it more difficult to successfully negoti-
ate new legislative and navigate judicially-imposed obstacles.  Although
these plans once represented “one of the great triumphs in American la-
bor relations” in providing employee benefits to workers of small em-
ployers in itinerant industries—like building and construction, trucking,
retail, and the entertainment industry9—such plans are quickly becoming
4 See Daniel Keating, Automobile Bankruptcies, Retiree Benefits, and the Futility of
Springing Priorities in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 96 IOWA L. REV. 261, 267 (2010) (citing
in part Steven J. Sacher, Issueman Tackles the New VEBAs, 35 PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA) 820
(Apr. 8, 2008)) (“Typically, an employer will seriously consider a VEBA trust for retiree
medical benefits when certain conditions are present.  The employer must be a company that is
financially precarious enough that the possibility of bankruptcy legitimately threatens its
employees.”).
5 See id. at 265–67.
6 See Introduction to Multiemployer Plans, PENS. BEN. GUAR. CORP., http://
www.pbgc.gov/prac/multiemployer/introduction-to-multiemployer-plans.html (last visited
Mar. 4, 2011). See also Concrete Pipe & Prod. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pens. Trust for
S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 637–38 (1993) (“[T]he nature of multiemployer plans . . . [is to] operate
by pooling contributions and liabilities.”).
7 See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 605–06.
8 See George M. Kraw, Four Reforms to Save Multiemployer Plans, BNA PENS. & BEN.
DAILY, Nov. 17, 2010, at 1, http://www.kraw.com/pdf/kraw-pension-benefits.pdf; U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-79, CHANGES NEEDED TO BETTER PROTECT MULTIEM-
PLOYER PENSION BENEFITS 1 (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/highlights/
d1179high.pdf [hereinafter GAO].  There are also roughly sixteen million retired workers and
their families who receive health and other benefits from these plans. See DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR, Comment Letter from the Nat’l Coord. Comm. for Multiemployer Plans to the Emp.
Ben. Sec. Admin 1 (Apr. 29, 2008), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/NCCMP042908.
pdf [hereinafter National Coordinating Committee for Multiemployer Plans].
9 See Kraw, supra note 8.
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just another part of the growing employee benefits crisis confronting the
United States.10
Three principal challenges face multiemployer plans in the coming
years.  First, a significant number of benefit plans are increasingly un-
derfunded and in danger of becoming insolvent.11  This state of affairs is
due in no small part to both decreasing union membership12 and more
retirees.13  Recent legislation in the form of the Pension Protection Act of
2006 (PPA)14 did not appear to go far enough in addressing the financial
woes of multiemployer plans.15  Although the Pension Relief Act of
2010 (PRA)16 does provide some funding relief for multiemployer pen-
sion plans in response to the current unstable economic environment, it is
10 See, e.g., Keating, supra note 4, at 294 (“Today, the folly of creating new legacy costs
is nothing short of obvious to employers as they watch both the defined-benefit pension crisis
and the retiree-medical-benefit crisis play themselves out on Wall Street and on Main Street.”);
David Cho, Growing Deficits Threaten Pensions: Accounting Tactics Conceal a Crisis for
Public Workers, WASH. POST, May 11, 2008, at A1 (discussing state pension crises).
11 See GAO, supra note 8 (“Most multiemployer plans report large funding shortfalls
and face an uncertain future.”).
12 See News Release, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Union Members—2010, at 1 (Jan.
21, 2011), www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf (explaining that union membership de-
creased in 2010 by 612,000 workers).  The number of Taft–Hartley plans is at a low point, and
private-sector unions in the United States are currently struggling to keep their density rate
over 7% of the workforce. See Charles A. Jeszeck, Private Pensions: Long-standing Chal-
lenges Remain for Multiemployer Pension Plans, Testimony Before the Committee on Health,
Education, Labor and Pensions, U.S. Senate, (May 27, 2010), in GAO Highlights, Report on
GAO-10-708T, May 27, 2010, at 9, 11, http://help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Jeszeck.pdf (dis-
cussing how the number of multiemployer plans has decreased steadily since the 1980s).
13 The Future of Retirement in the United States: Hearing before the S. Sp. Comm. On
Aging, 108th Cong. 1 (2004) (statement of, Jagadeesh Gokhale), available at http://
www.cato.org/testimony/ct-jg040122.html [hereinafter Future of Retirement] (“Population
projections by the Social Security Administration indicate that between the year 2003 and
2030, the number of working-aged individuals (those aged 20–64) will increase by just 13.3
percent.  The number of those aged 65 and older, however, will increase by 93.1 percent.
(These rates of population increase were 51.6 percent and 71.1 percent respectively during the
previous 30 years.)”).
14 Pension Protection Act (PPA) of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780.  PPA
establishes for multiemployer pension plans new funding requirements, additional funding
rules for plans that are in endangered or critical status, enhanced disclosure requirements to
participants regarding a plan’s funding status, and a requirement that defined benefit plans
offer a joint and 75% survivor annuity option. PENS. ANALYST, Pension Protection Act of
2006 Requires Major Changes to Multiemployer Defined Benefit Plans in 2008 and Beyond,
PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL, Jun. 2007, at 1, http://www.prudential.com/media/managed/Pen-
sAnalyst.PPA06.MultiemployerDB.2008.pdf [hereinafter PENSION ANALYST].
15 For instance, among other provisions, it merely gives incentives to Taft–Hartley plans
that find themselves in “endangered,” “seriously endangered” or “critical” status to ensure that
these underfunded plans address their funding issues. PENSION ANALYST, supra note 14, at 3.
Yet these notice and reporting requirements have not stopped the hemorrhaging, as more
Taft–Hartley plans are in danger now than in 2006. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
16 Pension Relief Act (PRA) of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-192, 124 Stat. 1280.
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still unclear what long-term impact it will have.17  Finally, more recent
legislation to provide multiemployer plans with some financial help, such
as The Create Jobs and Save Benefits Act of 2010,18 have died in the
Senate committee this past year.19
In addition to these financial woes facing multiemployer pension
plans, a second major issue facing multiemployer plans involves new
healthcare regulations.  Multiemployer health benefits are perceived as
too generous,20 and starting in 2018, they may face a new 40% excise tax
under the federal Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010
(PPACA).21  Multiemployer health plans also must consider the impact
of new PPACA provisions involving “grandfathered plans,” “minimum
essential benefits,” and “health benefit exchanges.”  Only by negotiating
this new regulatory terrain can these plans hope to continue providing
cost-effective health benefits to their members.
Third, and finally, there are significant judicial challenges to both
multiemployer pension and health plans.  Recent decisions made by
courts in the multiemployer plan context have made governance of such
plans, by plan administrators and other fiduciaries, even more difficult.
This is problematic because multiemployer plan administrators need to
know the scope of their fiduciary obligations when dealing with claim
issues, so as not to inadvertently breach their fiduciary duties to plan
participants and beneficiaries while making claim determinations.22  To
illustrate typical interpretation issues in this environment, this Article
considers recent developments in how reviewing courts handle benefit
denials.  Consideration of these issues will give some indication of the
17 The PRA specifically includes provisions that will reduce required employer contribu-
tions and will extend the amortization period for investment losses for multiemployer plans.
Id. § 211.
18 S. 3157, 111th Congress (2010), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/
z?c111:S.3157: [hereinafter Bill Text] (permitting multiemployer pension plans to merge or
form alliances with other plans, as well as to increase PBGC guarantees for insolvent plans to
increase participant benefits).
19 See THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, Bill Summary & Status, 111th Congress (2009-2010),
S. 3157, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:s.03157: (last visited Apr. 4, 2011)
(noting that last major action was referral of bill to Senate Committee on March 23, 2010).
20 See Editorial, Cadillac Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/01/16/opinion/16sat1.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1 (defining employer-sponsored as high-
priced health insurance policies).
21 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119.  Although PPACA faces numerous constitutional challenges in the courts, which means
that the 2018 Cadillac tax and other provisions could be struck down.  Patricia Donovan, Tis
the Season for Constitutional Challenges to PPACA, HEALTHCARE INTELLIGENCE NETWORK
(Dec. 22, 2010), http://hin.com/blog/2010/12/22/tis-the-season-for-constitutional-challenges-
to-ppaca.  This Article proceeds under the assumption that PPACA will eventually be found to
be constitutional.
22 See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
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complexity of the questions that the Judiciary continues to wrestle with
in the multiemployer plan context.
This Article proceeds in four Parts to describe the significant chal-
lenges facing multiemployer plans in the current political and legal envi-
ronment.  Part I introduces the basics of multiemployer benefit plans.
Part II considers the financial challenges to multiemployer pension plans
and possible solutions.  Part III explores the potential impact that
PPACA may have on the ability of multiemployer health plans to con-
tinue providing health benefits to their members on a cost-effective basis.
Lastly, Part IV concludes by looking at a typical issue of judicial inter-
pretation that threatens to make multiemployer pension and healthcare
plan administration even more complicated.  The hope is that by address-
ing financial, healthcare, and judicial challenges, a more sustainable way
forward can be plotted so that multiemployer benefit plans can continue
to provide crucial employee benefits to the next generation of union
workers.
I. MULTIEMPLOYER BENEFIT PLAN PRIMER
Employees receive many different types of compensation for their
work.  An increasingly large portion of this compensation, as much as
40% in some cases, is in the form of employee benefits.23  Employee
benefits come in two generic flavors: deferred compensation and in-kind
benefits.  The primary examples of deferred compensation plans are pen-
sions and retirement plans.  Employees earn this type of compensation in
the present, but it is not available to the employee until later—generally
after reaching normal retirement age.  On the other hand, compensation
that is usable in the short-term, such as health, disability, or life insur-
ance benefits, constitutes in-kind payments.
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)24
is the comprehensive federal law that regulates the provision of em-
ployer-provided pension benefit and welfare plans: “ERISA protects em-
ployee pensions and other benefits by providing insurance[,] . . .
specifying certain plan characteristics in detail[,] . . . and by setting forth
certain general fiduciary duties applicable to the management of both
pension and nonpension benefit plans.”25  Although employers are not
required to offer employee benefit plans to their employees, once such
plans are adopted, ERISA provides the applicable legal framework.
23 See STEVEN L. WILLBORN, STEWART J. SCHWAB, JOHN F. BURTON, JR. & GILLIAN
LESTER, EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 665 (4th ed. 2007).
24 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (Supp. 2010).  Following the practice of other ERISA arti-
cles, this Article hereinafter refers to the original section numbers as enacted by ERISA in the
“ERISA §” format, rather than to the United States Code section numbers.
25 Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496 (1996).
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Rather than relying on the distinction between deferred compensa-
tion and in-kind benefits, ERISA divides the universe of covered em-
ployee benefit plans into employee pension benefit plans and employee
welfare-benefit plans.26  ERISA plans can also be categorized by the type
and number of employers engaged in their provision.  Most employer
plans are single employer plans run by individual employers.27  On the
other hand, multiemployer plans are sponsored by more than one em-
ployer under provisions of a collective bargaining agreement for the ben-
efit of union members,28 while multiple employer plans are sponsored by
unrelated employers, outside of a collective bargaining agreement.  Dif-
ferent provisions apply to these benefit plan arrangements under
ERISA.29
In addition to ERISA, multiemployer plans are also regulated by
Section 302(c)(5) of the Taft–Hartley Amendments of 1947.30  Under
Section 302(c)(5), multiemployer benefit plans must be established in
trust to provide employee benefits to union employees.31  The union and
management must each appoint half of the plan’s trustees.32  Regardless
of who appointed them, trustees have a fiduciary duty to act in the sole
and exclusive interest of the plan and its participants.33
Because a multiemployer plan involves more than one employer, it
is not uncommon for large plans to have hundreds, or even thousands of
contributing employers.34  Employer contributions are usually made on a
per-hour basis, but may also be measured by some other unit of produc-
tion.  Service with all of the employers contributing to the plan is added
together to compute a participant’s vesting and benefit-accrual credit.35
These features allow an employee to accrue pension and health benefits
seamlessly, despite transfers from one contributing employer to
another.36
26 See ERISA §§ 3(3), 3(4).
27 See generally JOHN H. LANGBEIN, SUSAN J. STABILE & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION
AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 64–71 (4th ed. 2006).
28 See ERISA § 3(37).
29 See generally COLLEEN E. MEDILL, INTRODUCTION TO EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW: POL-
ICY AND PRACTICE 240 (3d ed. 2011).
30 Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (2006)).
31 Id.
32 Id. (requiring a multiemployer plan to be maintained as a trust fund sponsored by a
joint board of trustees, and that “employees and employers are equally represented in the
administration of [the] fund”).
33 Introduction to Multiemployer Plans, supra note 6.
34 See National Coordinating Committee for Multiemployer Plans, supra note 8.
35 See Introduction to Multiemployer Plans, supra note 6 (“The bargaining parties nego-
tiate a contribution rate and the trustees translate that rate into a benefit.  Decisions to increase
benefits or change the plan are also typically made by the board of trustees.”).
36 Indeed, portability of plan benefits between employers is one of the primary advan-
tages of the multiemployer plan framework. See Newsletters/Alerts, Executive Alert: Multiem-
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Although individual employers make contributions measured by the
work performed by their workers, those contributions, once received, are
not specifically earmarked for the employees of the employers who make
them.37  Rather, all contributions, and the earnings thereon, are available
to pay the benefits of each participant, based on that participant’s service
record.  Thus, multiemployer plans “operate by pooling contributions
and liabilities.”38  Furthermore, “[a]n employer’s contributions are not
solely for the benefit of its employees or employees who have worked
for it alone.”39
With regard to pension benefits, most multiemployer pension plans
are established and maintained as defined benefit plans (DBPs).40  Em-
ployee pension benefit plans under ERISA generally come in two distinct
types: DBPs and defined contribution plans (DCPs).41  Because employ-
ers are responsible for providing a defined benefit amount to employees
at retirement under DBP arrangements, there is more regulation of these
plans so that the promised benefits are available upon retirement and
plans do not default on their pension promises.  For instance, ERISA
provides minimum vesting, benefit accrual, and funding standards for
DBPs and sets up an insurance scheme, operated by the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), to address cases of employer termina-
tions.42  On the other hand, employers are only responsible to contribute
money to employee’s individual plan accounts under the DCP model and
that is where their responsibility ends.
In DBPs, which are the focus of this Article, the burden is placed on
the employer to contribute funds to the pension plan on an actuarially-
sound basis so that sufficient funds exist to pay the worker when she
retires.43  Under this arrangement, the risk is placed on the employer to
invest sufficiently to fund the ongoing pension expenses.  The required
ployer Pension Funding Reform: Helpful, but Systemic Problems Persist, Baker & Hostetler
LLP, (May 28, 2010), http://www.bakerlaw.com/alerts/multiemployer-pension-funding-re-
form-helpful-but-systemic-problems-persist-05-28-2010/ [hereinafter Executive Alert] (“[A]n
employee who moves amongst several employers in the same industry will accrue an aggre-
gate . . . benefit which will reflect all of the work performed by that employee in that
industry.”).
37 See Concrete Pipe & Prod. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pens. Trust for S. Cal., 508
U.S. 602, 637–38 (1993).
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 See Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pens. Fund v. Schilli Corp., 420 F.3d 663, 667 (7th
Cir. 2005).
41 See ERISA § 3(4).
42 See Introduction to Multiemployer Plans, supra note 6 (“Multiemployer plans are sub-
ject to many of the vesting, accrual, and minimum participation rules that apply to single-
employer plans.”).
43 See id. (“Most multiemployer plans are ‘unit benefit’ plans that offer a specified dol-
lar-amount benefit per month multiplied by years of credited service.”).
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minimum funding of DBPs is calculated based on a complex actuarial
analysis revolving around factors such as age, length of service, pro-
jected future salary increases, and rate of return on plan investments.44
The current low level of union density in the private sector of the
United States has been especially problematic in multiemployer defined
benefit plans because such plans operate on the assumption that current
workers’ contributions to the plan will support older workers in their
retirement.45  With multiemployer plans, “[t]he general principle at work
is that each employer must make regular contributions to the plan to fund
the . . . benefits of those employees who perform services for that
employer.”46
Benefits from a defined benefit plan are primarily paid in the form
of an annuity, which comes in many forms, but generally provides a
stream of payments to the employee for the rest of their life.47  As a
result of the annuity form of payment, not only is the risk of investment
return placed on the employer, but so is the risk of employee longevity.48
ERISA also requires that DBPs contain payment features that permit a
spouse to continue to receive some benefit from the plan after the death
of the covered employee.49
Because of the risks associated with employers maintaining defined
benefit plans, ERISA establishes a scheme of plan termination insur-
ance.50  Congress created the PBGC to administer this insurance program
and provide some level of retirement income for employees under DBPs,
44 Funding of defined benefit plans is highly regulated by ERISA under the complex
minimum funding standards of ERISA §§ 301–305.
45 See Jeszeck, supra note 12, at 10 (explaining that for multiemployer plans “the pro-
portion of active participants paying into the fund[s] to others who are no longer paying into
the fund[s] has decreased, thereby increasing plan liabilities.”).
46 Executive Alert, supra note 36.
47 See David Pratt, Retirement in a Defined Contribution Era: Making the Money Last,
41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1091, 1139 (2008).
48 See id. at 1139–41; Marion Crain, Afterword: The American Romance with Autonomy,
10 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 187, 201 n.33 (2006) (“Most of these employers were planning
to shift [from defined benefit plans] to expanded 401(k) plans in which employees rather than
employers will bear the risks of inflation, market volatility, and longevity (outliving one’s
savings).”); Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 477
(2004) (“[T]o the extent the employer maintaining a defined benefit plan attracts employees
who value defined benefit coverage, the employer is likely to lure older employees and the
longevity risks associated with a self-selected workforce attracted to a classic defined benefit
annuity by the expectation of long life spans.”).
49 The qualified joint survivor annuity (QJSA) and qualified preretirement survivor an-
nuity (QPSA) for surviving spouses are the default forms of distribution provided for under
defined benefit plans. See ERISA § 205.  For a case concerning the annuity options for sur-
viving spouses and the gender equity issues implicated thereby, see Lorenzen v. Emp. Ret.
Plan of the Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 896 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1990).
50 ERISA § 4022.
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if the employer should default on their pension promises.51  The cost of
the PBGC is borne primarily by employers that maintain pension plans
through monthly employer contributions.52  Contribution amounts are
calculated both by participant and based on the amount of unvested
vested benefits the plan maintains.53  Unfortunately, the PBGC currently
has insufficient funds to cover many insured benefits and its multiem-
ployer plan program has run a deficit every year since 2003.54
Even when the PBGC has a surplus, it only provides a percentage of
the normal retirement benefit below a limit set by statute.55  Matters are
made even more precarious because many employers of multiemployer
plans are facing significant financial difficulties and increasingly are de-
faulting on their required contributions to these plans.56  Although the
trustees of these plans have the statutory authority to collect delinquent
contributions under ERISA § 515,57 this is a time-consuming process
and may require expensive litigation.58
Terminations of defined benefit plans can be divided into two cate-
gories: mass withdrawals or plan amendments.59  With a mass with-
drawal, “employers withdraw or cease to be obligated to contribute to the
plan,” while “[a] plan amendment termination occurs when the plan
adopts an amendment that provides that participants will receive no
credit for service with any employer after a specified date, or an amend-
51 Id. See also About PBGC, PENS. BEN. GUAR. CORP., http://www.pbgc.gov/about/who-
we-are.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2010).
52 See Introduction to Multiemployer Plans, supra note 6 (“In multiemployer plans, the
amount of the employer’s contribution is set by a collective bargaining agreement that speci-
fies a contribution formula (such as $3 per hour worked by each employee covered by the
agreement) and further provides that contributions must be paid to the plan on a monthly
basis.”).
53 The Pension Protection Act of 2006 has recently increased the annual premium
amount that employers must contribute to the PBGC, while at the same time increasing mini-
mum funding requirements for such plans. See Pension Protection Act of 2006, H.R. 4, 109th
Cong. §§ 101–16, 401–12 (2006).
54 See Kraw, supra note 8, at 2 (By the beginning of fiscal year 2010, the deficit in
PBGC funding for these plans was almost $1 billion.).
55 In 2009 the maximum protected pension was $54,000 for an employee who retired at
age 65.  Press Release, PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION, PBGC Announces Maxi-
mum Insurance Benefit for 2009 (Nov. 3, 2008), available at http://www.pbgc.gov/news/press/
releases/pr09-03.html.  The amount is higher for those who retire at a later age and less for
those who retire when younger. Id.
56 See J. Mark Poerio et al., Pension Plan Funding Notices and Delinquent Plan Contri-
butions 1, STAYCURRENT, Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker LLP (May 2008), available at
http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/917.pdf (“The current economic downturn is
likely to expand the ranks of underfunded multiemployer (union) pension plans, and cause
more employers to fall behind in making required contributions to their pension and welfare
plans.”).
57 ERISA § 515. See also ERISA § 502(g).
58 See Poerio et al., supra note 56.
59 ERISA § 4041A.
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ment that makes it no longer a covered plan.”60  Currently, the PBGC is
responsible for $2.3 billion in future assistance to terminated multiem-
ployer plans and it is unlikely that these funds will be recovered in the
future.61
Employers in underfunded multiemployer plans find it difficult to
leave such plans because of the threat of withdrawal liability.62  Congress
enacted the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments of 1980 (MP-
PAA)63 in an effort to protect the financial stability of multiemployer
pension plans,64 and withdrawal liability is triggered when an employer
partially or completely withdraws from such a plan.65
The goal of withdrawal liability is to keep employers in the mul-
tiemployer arrangement by basing their liability on the employer’s share
of the plan’s unfunded vested benefits.66  Yet, as current PBGC funding
deficits make clear,67 this provision alone has not kept multiemployer
pension plans from terminating, especially given current economic and
demographic realities.68  Nor has the MPPAA led to better funding of
multiemployer plans.69  This underfunded status has placed additional
regulatory constraints on many plans under the Pension Protection Act
and other pension laws.70
60 Introduction to Multiemployer Plans, supra note 6 (“Unlike single-employer plans,
multiemployer plans continue to pay all vested benefits out of existing plan assets and with-
drawal liability payments.  PBGC’s guarantee of the benefits in a terminated, multiemployer
plan—payable as financial assistance to the plan—only starts if and when the plan is unable to
make payments at the statutorily guaranteed level.”).
61 Kraw, supra note 8, at 2.
62 See Jeszeck, supra note 12, at 7.
63 Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat.
1208.
64 Multiemployer health plans, as discussed below, are not automatically subject to with-
drawal liability. See infra notes 147–49 and accompanying text.
65 See Jeszeck, supra note 12, at 7 (explaining how plan withdrawal liability works).
66 See id. at 8 (explaining how “this greater financial risk on employers and lower guar-
anteed benefit level for participants in multiemployer plans, [is supposed to] create incentives
for employers, participants, and their collective bargaining representatives to avoid insolvency
and to collaborate in trying to find solutions to the plan’s financial difficulties.”).
67 For instance, Moody’s Investor Service estimated the total unfunded liability of 126 of
the nation’s largest multiemployer pension plans at over $165 billion in 2008. See GAO Re-
port, supra note 8.  The National Coordinating Committee for Multiemployer Plans found in a
2009 survey that four out of every five of the plans reviewed were “endangered” or in “criti-
cal” condition as far as their funding levels. See id. Perhaps most significantly, the GAO
reported in 2010 that the proportion of multiemployer plans that are less than 80 percent
funded rose from 23 percent of plans in 2008 to 68 percent of plans in 2009. See id.
68 See Kraw, supra note 8, at 2 (discussing the how the financial reality of withdrawal
liability is a disincentive for new employers to join multiemployer plans since withdrawal
liability must be put on audited financial statements).
69 See Jeszeck, supra note 12, at 12 (discussing how the intent of MPPA to limit PBGC’s
exposure to future losses from underfunded plans has not yet been realized).
70 PENSION ANALYST, supra note 14, at 3–4 (noting additional funding and notice re-
quirements for underfunded plans).
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Having reviewed the necessary multiemployer plan framework and
terminology, the next section considers proposals for overcoming the fi-
nancial challenges to multiemployer pension plans.
II. THE FINANCIAL CHALLENGE TO MULTIEMPLOYER PENSION PLANS
Not surprisingly, the reason why many multiemployer pension plans
are underfunded is the current global recession that began in 2007.71
Many investments made by multiemployer trustees during this time pe-
riod turned out disastrously.72  Of course, multiemployer plans are not
alone in this regard—for instance, public pension plans also have en-
dured significant losses in value during the recent global recession.73
Yet, there is now new evidence that with the recovery of global and
domestic markets, a good number of multiemployer pension plans are
starting to recover financially.  For instance, The Segal Company, in its
Winter 2011 Survey of its 370 client plans, found that more than half of
the surveyed plans (53%) were now in good financial health, a signifi-
cant increase from 2009 (38%).74
Of course, there are important structural issues as well.  There are
fewer new employee participants in these plans, while at the same time
there is a larger aging workforce that needs to be paid out of these
funds.75  This means that the growth of multiemployer plans has been
stalled by the lack of growth in union representation and the resultant
lack of union economic power to bargain pension benefits for their mem-
bers.  Finally, the PGBC has been unable to keep up with the rate of
newly-terminated multiemployer pension plans.76
Multiemployer pension plan underfunding, however, is not a new
issue or challenge.  As explained in the previous section, Congress
amended ERISA in 1980 to try to address the problem of significant
underfunding of Taft–Hartley plans.  The MPPAA attempted to protect
the financial stability of these plans through the introduction of with-
drawal liability but problems with plan funding persist for many
71 Jeszeck, supra note 12, at 8.
72 See id. at 13 (discussing the serious short-term financial stresses experienced by mul-
tiemployer plans).
73 See William T. Payne & Stephen M. Pincus, The Constitutional Limitations of Public
Employee Pension Reform Legislation, 19 THE PUBLIC LAWYER 12, 12 (2011) (“The recent
recession has refocused attention on the issue of underfunded government pensions in the
United States.”).
74 See Survey of Plans’ 2010 Zone Status, SEGAL SURVEY 1 (Winter 2011), http://www.
segalco.com/publications/surveysandstudies/winter2011zonestatus2010.pdf.
75 Id. at 10 (commenting on the decrease in the proportion of active participants to retir-
ees due to an aging workforce).
76 See id. at 11–12 (discussing how PBGC’s liabilities have outpaced asset growth since
1998).
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Taft–Hartley funds.77  There are, however, many reforms that could po-
tentially cure some of these funding issues.  For instance, current em-
ployees do not directly contribute to their pension plans, unlike their
public pension plan counterparts.78  Additionally, most multiemployer
pension plans are defined benefit plans, which put the risk of funding
these plans squarely on employers.79  Such defined benefit plans also
require compliance with complicated and time-consuming benefit vest-
ing schedules.80  Like in the single employer plan context, multiemployer
pension plans could consider adopting a defined contribution plan para-
digm, which would mean that once the employers contributed to the mul-
tiemployer pension plan, their funding responsibilities would end.
Not surprisingly, however, both increased employee contributions
and shifting to the defined contribution model would likely lead to strong
union and employee objections.  This is because there is a belief among
unions and their members that pensions are a form of deferred compen-
sation and they take lower salaries now, in order to have retirement bene-
fits later.81  The argument continues that they should not have to forego
even more of their salary in the short-term due to increased contributions.
Additionally, unions and their members maintain that they should
not have all the responsibility of investing their retirement monies so that
they have enough to retire on in the future.  Indeed, recent experience in
the single employer plan environment with 401K plans suggest that em-
ployees are far less ready for retirement under the defined contribution
plan model and generally do not have enough money saved to retire suc-
cessfully.82  This state of affairs may be due to most U.S. employees’ the
lack of financial sophistication.
George Kraw, an attorney who specializes in the representation of
multiemployer plans in California, and is a former member of the
PBGC’s Advisory committee, has put forth some other alternatives.83
The rest of this Part considers four proposals advanced by Kraw, includ-
ing: (1) more readily permitting plans to cut vested benefits; (2) allowing
77 Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1208.
78 See Paul M. Secunda, Constitutional Contracts Clause Challenges in Public Pension
Litigation, 28 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 263 (2011) (detailing how recent legislation would
have Wisconsin public employees contribute funds to their public pension plans).
79 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
80 See, e.g., ERISA § 203(a) (29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)).
81 See Lorraine A. Schmall, Keeping Employer Promises When Relational Incentives No
Longer Pertain: “Right Sizing” and Employee Benefits, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 276, 279
(2000) (“[E]mployees own their pension expectancies—what they thought they were promised
in exchange for working at a rate of pay that reflects contributions to their deferred benefits.”).
82 See Paul M. Secunda, 401K Follies: A Proposal to Reinvigorate the United States
Annuity Market, ABA SECTION ON TAXATION NEWS QUARTERLY 13, 14 (Fall 2010) (arguing
that reliance on defined contribution pension plans in the private-sector is likely to going to
lead to a massive retirement income security problem in the United States).
83 See Kraw, supra note 8.
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voluntary caps or elimination of withdrawal liability; (3) setting up a
Chapter 11-type procedure for permitting multiemployer pension to equi-
tably address financial difficulties; and (4) promoting a new fund invest-
ment strategy based on the “new normal” of investment return.84
Although none of these proposals might be considered ideal from a
worker perspective, unions and their members may be willing to buy into
some of these proposals if—like with the institution of VEBAs in 2007
in the retiree healthcare context—little other choice exists in saving their
pension benefits.
A. Permit Cutting of Vested Benefits
The first suggested reform is to allow plans to cut vested benefits if
plan trustees deem it necessary and plan sponsors, like the employer and
union, agree.85  Currently, the Pension Protection Act of 2006 allows
multiemployer plans to cut some vested benefits for plan participants if
the plan’s underfunded status becomes “endangered” or “critical.”86
Kraw’s proposal would extend this power to plans that are not yet
critically underfunded, but are headed in that general direction.87  The
argument goes that it would be generally easier for Taft–Hartley plans to
act, without having to battle insolvency at the same time.88  In this vein,
Kraw comments that “[t]he guiding principle here should be that plans
must not be forced to adopt contribution rates from active participants
that result in uncompetitive and unsustainable labor costs and loss of
jobs.”89
Vested benefits are sacrosanct under ERISA.  Indeed, there is a
broad anti-alienation provision that prohibits accrued benefits from being
used in most situations for anything but the benefit of the participants
and beneficiaries of the plan.90  Because of the sanctity of such vested
benefits under employee benefits law, the promulgation of such a radical
measure would have to be accompanied by the ability of the participating
unions to veto any such measure.  Of course, that might make the cutting
of vested benefits less likely to happen, but it appears to be a step that
84 Id. at 2.
85 Id.
86 See PENSION ANALYST, supra note 14, at 3–4.  Endangered status means that the fund
is less than 80 percent funded, while critical status means that the fund is less than 65 percent
funded. See Jeszeck, supra note 12, at 4.
87 Kraw, supra note 8, at 2.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Normally, the anti-alienation rules operate to prevent an employer from assigning or
alienating plan benefits. See ERISA § 206(d).  “In-service distributions” from an individual
account plan or qualified domestic relations orders (QDROs), which permit a plan administra-
tor to pay a former spouse or other dependent from a participant’s pension benefits, represent
two important exceptions to the general anti-alienation provisions. Id.
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should only be taken if the long-term prospects for the plan are dubious
and immediate, and aggressive action is needed to keep the employers in
the covered industry from shedding jobs.
B. Cap or Eliminate Withdrawal Liability
A second possible reform would be to cap or eliminate withdrawal
liability to allow more employers to join multiemployer plans.91  The
idea here is that employers are not joining multiemployer pension plans
because they are concerned about joining such a plan, and then when
financial problems occur, potentially being stuck with vast withdrawal
liability.92
Kraw’s suggested reform seeks to give multiemployer pension plans
the ability to incentivize more employer members by either capping the
possible amount of withdrawal liability or doing away with such liability
altogether.93  In this vein, Kraw argues that even though withdrawal lia-
bility is supposed to incentivize employers, unions, and participants to
find solutions to their funding issues, the reality is that withdrawal liabil-
ity has interfered with collective bargaining and kept new employers
from joining multiemployer arrangements.94
This proposal fails under principles of statutory preemption.95  Mul-
tiemployer pension plans are simply not able to voluntarily agree with
new employer members to cap or eliminate withdrawal liability, since
such a provision would be directly inconsistent with MPPAA require-
ments and consequently, preempted.96
Thus, Congress would have to amend the MPPAA in order to adopt
the capping or elimination of withdrawal liability approach.  Although
Congress could conceivably undertake such steps to improve the sol-
vency of multiemployer pension plans, the PBGC would likely be
91 Kraw, supra note 8, at 2.
92 Executive Alert, supra note 36 (“By participating in a multiemployer pension plan, an
employer . . . accepts a risk of loss based on its share of the plan’s unfunded pension obliga-
tions. For example, negative investment performance inevitably will require each remaining
participating employer to contribute more, or face the prospect of a more significant with-
drawal liability if and when it chooses (or has to) walk away.”).
93 Kraw, supra note 8, at 2.
94 Id.  Indeed, Kraw’s arguments ring true with many employee benefit law experts who
have long believed that the MPPAA overreaches because no rational employer who has any
choice would ever agree to join a multiemployer plan where withdrawal liability is completely
out of its control and virtually unlimited in amount. See MEDILL, supra note 29, at 240.
95 Under a traditional statutory preemption analysis, conflict or obstacle preemption oc-
curs where [a contractual provision] “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council,
530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
96 Waiver of withdrawal liability is only permitted to be undertaken by the PBGC; and
then only where an employer has withdrawn completely from a plan and then subsequently
resumes covered operations. See ERISA § 4207; 29 C.F.R. §§ 4207.1–4207.11 (2010).
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against such a measure because almost all multiemployer pension plans
are defined benefit plans, and the PBGC needs the withdrawal liability
money for its own funding purposes.  Furthermore, even if the MPPAA
could be amended in this way, a cap may create a moral hazard problem
and further increase the PBGC’s potential liabilities.  This is because
PBGC premiums for insurance coverage are based on actuarial assump-
tions,97 and the current ability to assess withdrawal liability is almost
certainly built into these assumptions.
C. Chapter 11-Type Bankruptcy Procedure As Alternative to Plan
Partitioning
Kraw’s third proposed reform would create a Chapter 11-type bank-
ruptcy procedure for severely distressed plans.98  This reform would be
an alternative to a proposal that has already been floated as a way to deal
with some of the insolvency issues facing multiemployer pension
plans.99
Under the partition proposal, the PBGC’s authority would be ex-
panded to partition plans so that multiemployer pension plans would be
able to at least save the viable parts of their plans.100  Currently, PBGC
has the authority to order the partition of a multiemployer pension
plan.101  The new proposed law, permitting “qualified partitions,” would
“permit a multiemployer plan to spin off into a new plan (‘partitioned
plan’) the liabilities and certain assets attributable to employees of em-
ployers who have filed for bankruptcy or who have failed to pay their
withdrawal liability.”102  Additionally, this qualified partition proposal
“would transfer responsibility to the PBGC for payment of the full plan
benefits of participants transferred to the partitioned plan, which in many
cases would be well above the amount guaranteed by the PBGC under
current law.”103
97 See Introduction to Multiemployer Plans, supra note 6.
98 Kraw, supra note 8, at 3.
99 Id.
100 Hearing on Multiemployer Defined Benefit Pension Plans: Before S. Comm. on
Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 111th Cong. 1 (2010) (statement of Phyllis C. Borzi,
Assistant Secretary of Labor, Employee Benefit Security Administration), available at  http://
www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/ty052710.html.
101 Id. (“ERISA empowers the PBGC to order the partition of a multiemployer plan, ei-
ther upon its own motion or upon application by the plan sponsor.  Partition is a statutory
mechanism that permits healthy employers to maintain a plan by carving out the plan liabilities
attributable to employees of employers who have filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.  Once parti-
tioned, the PBGC assumes liability for paying benefits to the participants of this newly carved-
out but terminated plan.”).
102 Id.
103 Id.
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Interestingly, critics of the qualified partition proposal, including the
Department of Labor’s (DOL) Employee Benefit Security Administra-
tion (EBSA), worry that this proposal will take money away from the
single-employer PBGC program and further burden the already un-
derfunded PBGC.104  Consequently, the Obama Administration is un-
likely to support a qualified partition proposal at this time.
As an alternative to qualified partitioning, Kraw suggests a Chapter
11-type bankruptcy procedure whereby the financial issues of finan-
cially-distressed plans could be handled in a more orderly manner and on
a case-by-case basis.105  These special bankruptcy rules for multiem-
ployer plans would be particularly appropriate with plans “whose finan-
cial obligations greatly exceed their assets, but who also still have
significant financial holdings.”106  In such cases, a bankruptcy court
could “allocate losses by taking into account the interests of all stake-
holders.”107  In particular, Kraw likes the fact that bankruptcy courts op-
erate under equitable concepts of law and therefore could fashion a just
outcome for all parties concerned.108
Although it is accurate to say that bankruptcy courts have the ability
to fashion equitable outcomes for distressed multiemployer pension
plans, unions might not readily agree to allow the bankruptcy courts to
decide the future of their benefit plans.  Recent history has demonstrated
that these courts have treated workers’ rights shoddily, including rights
to retirement health benefits, all in the name of the allowing companies
to emerge from bankruptcy.
One notable example of how retiree benefits are treated in bank-
ruptcy is provided by the case of In re Horizon Natural Resources Co.109
This case demonstrates employers’ abilities to circumvent the require-
ments of Bankruptcy Code Section 1114,110 even where union members
have vested retirement benefits.  In Horizon, ten unionized coal compa-
nies filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11.111  All of the companies’
104 Id. (“We are concerned about the impact of the proposal on participants in single-
employer plans trusteed by the PBGC.  As of the end of fiscal year 2009, the single-employer
program insured about 33.6 million people covered by more than 27,600 plans, and reported a
net deficit of $21.1 billion.”).
105 Kraw, supra note 8, at 3.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 See id.
109 316 B.R. 268 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2004).
110 Section 1114 provides that the bankruptcy trustee “shall timely pay and shall not mod-
ify any retiree benefits” unless a modification is approved by the court or the retirees. See 11
U.S.C. § 1114(e) (2006).  The statute further limits such modifications, stating that if the em-
ployer causes a modification of retiree benefits within 180 days prior to the bankruptcy filing
and at a time when the employer is insolvent, the benefits shall be reinstated “unless the court
finds that the balance of the equities clearly favors such modification.” Id. at § 1114(l).
111 Horizon Natural Resources, 316 B.R. at 270–71.
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collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) contained successorship
clauses that required new owners of the companies to assume the respon-
sibilities of the previous collective bargaining agreement.112  During the
bankruptcy proceedings, however, the debtors decided to liquidate their
companies.113  Citing an inability to find buyers willing to assume the
retiree health obligations of the prior collective bargaining agreement,
the court allowed the sales to proceed free of the successorship clauses,
essentially terminating all retiree health benefits.114
Consequently, unions would most likely only consider a Chapter
11-type bankruptcy procedure if there were no other alternatives, and the
very survival of the employer or industry was at stake.  It thus seems
unlikely that such a strategy would provide the necessary means to over-
come the financial problems besieging these pension plans in the current
environment.
D. Reduce Investment Assumption Rates and Permit Plans to Hedge
Kraw’s final reform suggestion, and perhaps the one with the most
potential to help turn the financial tide, would give multiemployer pen-
sion plans “greater flexibility to reduce investment assumption rates be-
low current levels.”115  Currently, most plans assume between six- and
eight-percent rates of return on their investments.116  Plans are generally
unwilling to reduce these unrealistic rates because doing so would
thereby increase the plan’s liabilities.117  Moreover, the lower the as-
sumed rate of investment return, the more assets the plan must have on
hand to pay current obligations to retirees.118
Kraw also argues that multiemployer pension plans should “immu-
nize” or hedge part or all of their assets and liabilities.119  “Immuniza-
112 Id. at 271.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 282–83.  Unfortunately for retirees, Horizon was not an aberration.  A similar
scenario unfolded in In re Ormet, 355 B.R. 37 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2006), where the court
enforced a unilateral modification to retiree health benefits over the objection of the union. Id.
at 43–44. See also In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 346 B.R. 307 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(finding that Section 1114 of the Bankruptcy Code permits a debtor to reject collective bar-
gaining agreement if the rejection is, among other things, “necessary” to the debtor’s ability to
reorganize.).
115 Kraw, supra note 8, at 2.
116 Id. at 3.
117 See Gambling Our Future, THE ECONOMIST, (Mar. 10, 2010, 7:04 PM), http://
www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2010/03/pension_crises (“The higher the rate they
assume, the smaller the projected liability.”).
118 See id. (“A big reason why states are so keen to maintain a projected 8% return is that
they use their projected returns on assets to discount their future obligations.”). See also John
E. Petersen, Fairy Tale Pension Projections, GOVERNING, (Mar. 2010), available at http://
www.governing.com/columns/public-finance/Fairy-Tale-Pension-Projections.html (discussing
how public pensions assumption in an 8% return rate has proven disastrous).
119 Kraw, supra note 8, at 3.
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tion” of portions of multiemployer pension plan’s investment portfolio
would be done by investing in securities that would increase or decrease
in direct correlation with an increase or decrease in pension plan liabili-
ties.120  Such “liability-aware investing” (LAI) seeks to “reduce a signifi-
cant portion of the economic risks of a defined benefit plan,”121 and “[i]n
particular, the risk of significant changes in interest rates used to discount
pension liabilities is addressed by LAI mandates.”122
Some critics argue that this dual-prong investment approach will
lead inevitably to lower investment returns.123  Yet, such lower invest-
ment returns may, in fact, be more consistent with the “new normal.”124
Additionally, by balancing these liability-driven investments with fixed-
income securities, much of the same risk-return profile on investments
likely can be maintained.125  In short, this investment strategy deserves
more careful consideration and could be an important part of an overall
strategy for repairing financially-battered multiemployer pension plans.
III. THE LEGISLATIVE CHALLENGE TO MULTIEMPLOYER
HEALTH PLANS
Multiemployer pension plans are certainly facing a difficult eco-
nomic and demographic environment.  Yet, the storm clouds are gather-
ing around multiemployer health plans as well.  A very fluid situation
exists for these plans as a result of multiemployer health plans being at
the epicenter of the political storm126 surrounding passage of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010.127  In fact, it actually took a
last-minute compromise—not assessing taxes on expensive, “Cadillac”
health care plans until 2018—that permitted the legislation to be enacted
with the support of the labor movement.128
Under this compromise, a 40% excise tax on “excess benefits” will
be imposed on health care providers, starting in 2018, to the extent that
120 This type of investing is called “liability-aware investing” or “LAI.” See Armand
Yambao, Liability Aware Investing For Defined Benefits Pension Funds, ENNIS, KNUPP &
ASSOCIATES, INC., 1 (Feb. 2008), available at http://www.nasra.org/resources/MVL/LAI.pdf.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Kraw, supra note 8, at 3.
124 Id.  See also Ernest Werlin, ‘The New Normal’ Means: Slow Growth and Low Re-
turns, HERALD-TRIBUNE, Dec. 15, 2010, at D3, available at http://www.heraldtribune.com/
article/20101230/columnist/12301031.
125 Kraw, supra note 8, at 3.
126 Editorial, Cadillac Plans, supra note 20 (discussing how multiemployer “Cadillac
plan” threatened to derail health care reform).
127 Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (as amended by the Health Care and Education Recon-
ciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029).
128 See Janet Hook and Noam N. Levey, Unions Agree to Compromise on ‘Cadillac Tax’
for Healthcare, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jan/15/nation/la-
na-health-congress15-2010jan15.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\21-1\CJP111.txt unknown Seq: 20 13-OCT-11 11:15
96 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 21:77
the aggregate value of the employer-sponsored health coverage for an
employee exceeds a threshold amount.129  Until now, health coverage
itself has not been taxed; indeed, it has been a highly tax-favored em-
ployee benefit.130  Under PPACA, however, the threshold dollar limita-
tion for multiemployer health plans in 2018 will be $10,200,131 though
that is just a starting point for determining the thresholds for taxing ex-
cess benefits.132
Because of the various ways that adjustments to this threshold will
be made under PPACA, an employer or employers with a workforce that
is more expensive to insure, due to age and gender characteristics, should
not be put at a disadvantage.133  Nevertheless, because multiemployer
health plans tend to be some of the more expensive health care plans,
many of these plans will have to modify their coverage or be forced to
pay the 40% excise tax on excess benefits.
In addition to the 2018 excise tax on multiemployer health plans,
there are also important challenges lurking around the corner for these
plans.  These challenges include issues revolving three PPACA concepts:
(1) “grandfathered plans,” (2) “minimum essential coverage,” and (3)
“health benefit exchanges.”
A. Grandfathered Plans
Whether an employer-provided health plan is subject to all, or only
some, of the new health care market reforms under PPACA depends on
whether the plan is a “grandfathered plan.”134  A grandfathered plan is a
group health plan that was in effect upon enactment of PPACA in March
2010.135  These grandfathered plans are exempt from many, but not all,
of the individual and group healthcare market reforms that are scheduled
to be implemented in 2014.136  For instance, grandfathered plans must
still comply with provisions relating to: (1) a uniform explanation of cov-
erage; (2) loss-ratio reports and rebate premiums; (3) excessive waiting
periods; (4) lifetime limits; (5) annual limits; (6) pre-existing health con-
129 I.R.C. § 4980I (2006) (as added by PPACA § 9001(a) (2010)).  This section of the
I.R.C. was held unconstitutional as “not severable” from PPACA in Florida v. U.S. Dept. of
Health and Human Services, 2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011).
130 MEDILL, supra note 29, at 19 (“For fiscal year 2011, the tax expenditure for health
care and long–term care insurance plans sponsored by employers is estimated at $115.2 bil-
lion.  This amount represents the second largest tax expenditure in the federal budget.”).
131 See I.R.C. § 4980I(b)(3).
132 CCH EDITORIAL STAFF, CCH’S LAW, EXPLANATION, AND ANALYSIS OF THE PATIENT
PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT ¶ 2205, at 969 (2010) [hereinafter CCH].
133 Id. ¶ 2205 at 970.
134 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), 111-148, § 1251(e), 124 Stat.
119 (2010).
135 Id.
136 Id.
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dition exclusions; and (7) the extension of dependent coverage to age
twenty-six.137
As far as multiemployer health plans, group health coverage, sub-
ject to CBAs ratified before the enactment of PPACA, are not covered by
all of the laws health care market reforms until that CBA terminates.138
Moreover, if a CBA is modified to conform to the new health care re-
quirements, it will be considered to remain in effect and will not be
treated as a non-grandfathered plan.139
One of the remaining questions is whether grandfathered status
under PPACA may be lost because of a change in the employer contribu-
tion rate to the plan.140  On this issue, EBSA has issued a “frequently
asked questions” (FAQ) guide about PPACA implementation.141  Be-
cause multiemployer health plans do not always know whether or when a
contributing employer changes its contribution rate as a percentage of the
cost of coverage,142 many multiemployer health plans sought regulatory
guidance on what steps should be taken to communicate with contribut-
ing employers.143
EBSA indicated that, “[i]f multiemployer plans and contributing
employers follow steps similar to those outlined in Q&A2, above, the
same relief will apply to the multiemployer plan unless or until the mul-
tiemployer plan knows that the contribution rate has changed.”144  Q&A2
in turn provides:
The Departments have determined that, until the issu-
ance of final regulations, they will not treat an insured
group health plan that is a grandfathered plan as having
ceased to be a grandfathered health plan immediately
based on a change in the employer contribution rate if
the employer plan sponsor and issuer take the following
steps:
• Upon renewal, an issuer requires a plan sponsor
to make a representation regarding its contribu-
tion rate for the plan year covered by the re-
newal, as well as its contribution rate on March
137 CCH, supra note 132, ¶ 185, at 120–21.
138 PPACA § 1251(d).
139 CCH, supra note 132, ¶ 185 at 121.
140 See United State Department of Labor’s Employee Benefit Security Administration
(EBSA), FAQ About the Affordable Care Act Implementation Part I, UNITED STATE DEPART-
MENT OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq-aca.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2011).
141 Id.
142 Id. at Q&A3.
143 Id.
144 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\21-1\CJP111.txt unknown Seq: 22 13-OCT-11 11:15
98 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 21:77
23, 2010 (if the issuer does not already have it);
and
• The issuer’s policies, certificates, or contracts of
insurance disclose in a prominent and effective
manner that plan sponsors are required to notify
the issuer if the contribution rate changes at any
point during the plan year.145
So, in short, Taft–Hartley health plans should be able to keep their
grandfathered status by following these interim steps until final regula-
tions have been issued.  Nevertheless, this issue and others like it high-
light the need for multiemployer health plan administrators to be vigilant
about plan changes that could potentially jeopardize their grandfathered
status.
B. Minimum Essential Coverage
The essential health benefits package offered by qualified health
benefit plans under PPACA, including multiemployer health plans,
“must include specific categories of benefits, meet certain cost-sharing
standards, and provide certain levels of coverage.”146  Beginning in
2014, minimum items and services include: (1) ambulatory patient ser-
vices; (2) emergency services; (3) hospitalization; (4) maternity and new-
born care; (5) mental health and substance abuse disorder services; (6)
prescription drugs; (7) rehabilitative services and devices; (8) laboratory
services; (9) preventive and wellness services; and (10) pediatric services
(including oral and vision care).147
Significantly, however, self-insured plans are not covered “‘health
plans’ for this purpose, and thus will not have to comply with the re-
quirements of the essential health benefits package.”148  As a result, in-
centives exist for multiemployer health benefit plans to go the self-
insured route, rather than purchasing health insurance coverage from a
third party.149
In fact, even smaller Taft–Hartley employee benefit plans may be
able to self-insure with the help of stop-loss insurance and the use of
145 Id. at Q&A2.
146 CCH, supra note 132, ¶ 205, at 128.
147 PPACA § 1302(a), (b)(1).  These benefits are supposed to be consistent with the scope
of benefits provided under a “typical” employer-sponsored plan. Id. § 1302(b)(2). Plans may,
of course, provide more than the minimum essential benefit. Id. § 1302(b)(5).
148 CCH, supra note 132, ¶ 205, at 128 (citing PPACA § 1301(b)(1)(B)).
149 A self-insured plan is one offered by a multiemployer plan that directly assumes the
major cost of health insurance for their employees. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEFI-
NITIONS OF HEALTH INSURANCE TERMS 6, http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/sp/healthterms.pdf (last
visited on Feb. 16, 2011).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\21-1\CJP111.txt unknown Seq: 23 13-OCT-11 11:15
2011] THE FORGOTTEN EMPLOYEE 99
relatively low attachment points.150  Stop-loss insurance operates by hav-
ing the self-insured plan cover up to a certain amount of a claim, and
then the stop-loss insurance coverage kicks in at that “attachment point”
to pay the rest.151  As the attachment point becomes lower and lower, the
insurance scheme begins to resemble a fully insured health plan.152
Nevertheless, the federal appellate courts that have considered this
issue continue to treat these plans as self-insured plans for employee-
benefit law purposes.153  Given the availability of this strategy, even
prior to the enactment of PPACA, the majority of multiemployer health
plans are already either wholly or partially self-funded.154
Consequently, the more multiemployer health plans become self-
insured plans, the less they will have to worry about providing their
members statutorily-required minimum essential benefits.  Although the
provision of additional benefits may be deemed in the best interest of
plan members, such provision may also undermine the ability of these
plans to provide cost-effective health care benefits and thus, the impact
of these provisions need to be monitored carefully.
C. Health Benefit Exchanges
A more insidious problem that might face multiemployer health
plans involves the creation of health benefit exchanges.  Effective in
2014, state-based American Health Benefit Exchanges and Small Busi-
ness Health Options Program (SHOP) Exchanges will be established.155
Through these programs, individuals and small businesses with up to 100
employees may purchase qualified health coverage.156  States may also
150 Stop-loss insurance is “a form of reinsurance for self-insured employers that limits the
amount the employers will have to pay for each person’s health care (individual limit) or for
the total expenses of the employer (group limit).” Id.  The limit at which the stop-loss insur-
ance kicks in is called the “attachment point.” See Am. Med. Servs., Inc. v. Bartlett, 111 F.3d
358, 361 (4th Cir. 1997) (involving Maryland employers’ purchase of “stop-loss insurance to
cover their plans’ benefit payments above an annual $25,000-per-employee level, known as
the ‘attachment point.’”).
151 See Am. Med. Servs., Inc., 111 F.3d at 361.
152 See id. at 362 (quoting In re: Maryland Stop Loss Insurance Litigation, No. MIA-370-
12195, at 4 (Dec. 8, 1995)) (“At very low attachment points . . . a ‘stop loss’ policy is merely a
substitution for health insurance.”).
153 Id. at 364 (“[Maryland]’s regulations fail to recognize that in a self-funded plan, with
or without stop-loss insurance and regardless of the attachment point, the provision of benefits
depends on the plan’s solvency, whereas the provision of benefits in an insured plan depends
entirely on the insurer’s solvency.”).
154 See James Conlon, Self-Insurance and Small Taft-Hartley Trust Funds (Part I), LA-
BORERS’ HEALTH AND SAFETY FUND OF NORTH AMERICA (Jul. 2008), http://www.lhsfna.org/
index.cfm?objectID=CA65B475-D56F-E6FA-9F3DBEDA4D41AEFC (“Self-insurance is in-
creasingly becoming the cost containment strategy of choice among Taft-Hartley Trust Funds
providing health and welfare benefits to their participants and their qualified dependents.”).
155 PPACA § 1311(b).
156 Id. § 1311(b)(1)(C).
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form regional Exchanges or allow more than one Exchange to operate in
the state, as long as each Exchange serves a distinct geographic area.157
A governmental agency or a non-profit organization will administer
these exchanges.158
Although health benefit exchanges do not directly impact multiem-
ployer health plans, their presence might exacerbate some of the finan-
cial difficulties that these plans are already facing.  For example, smaller
employers might decide that instead of joining a multiemployer plan and
worrying about withdrawal liability, they will just provide no health cov-
erage, suffer an excise tax, and let their employees get their health cover-
age through these exchanges.159  As pointed out in the previous
discussion of the multiemployer pension plans, employers are already
reluctant to join these plans because of the potential for substantial with-
drawal liability if they decide to leave such a plan.160
Yet, here, a cap or elimination of withdrawal liability may give the
proper incentive for additional employers to join multiemployer health
plans.161  Unlike multiemployer pension plans, the MPPAA’s withdrawal
liability provisions do not apply to multiemployer health plans.162
Rather, the current practice is to impose withdrawal liability by contrac-
tual agreement, if at all.163  Thus, the voluntary cap-waiver idea, ad-
vanced by Kraw in the multiemployer pension context, could potentially
work if a multiemployer health benefit plan currently assesses such with-
drawal liability under a CBA or under a trust agreement.  The elimina-
tion or capping of such liability would then simply be a matter of
amending the relevant documents.
Moreover, given that this is a private ordering situation, it probably
would not be necessary to create a cap-waiver for existing members,
though existing members might object to being subject to withdrawal
157 CCH, supra note 132, ¶ 215, at 138.
158 PPACA § 1311(d).
159 See JACKSON LEWIS, HEALTH CARE REFORM: LABOR RELATIONS IMPLICATIONS FOR
UNIONIZED AND UNION-FREE EMPLOYERS, 6–7 (2011), http://www.jacksonlewis.com/media/
pnc/2/media.1182.pdf (“The excise tax imposed on employers opting to end all health insur-
ance coverage is substantially less than the cost of the typical health insurance premium for an
individual. Consequently, employers may seriously consider terminating health insurance
coverage.”).
160 See Kraw, supra note 8, at 2.
161 See supra notes 91–97 and accompanying text (discussing withdrawal liability cap or
waiver).
162 MEDILL, supra note 29, at 264 (“ERISA Section 515 concerning delinquent employer
contributions applies to multiemployer welfare benefit plans (particularly health care plans) as
well as multiemployer pension plans.  The employer withdrawal liability provisions of the
MPPAA, however, apply only to multiemployer pension plans.”).
163 Id. (“[A] multiemployer welfare benefit plan cannot assess withdrawal liability against
a participating employer unless the employer has expressly agreed to the assessment of with-
drawal liability.”).
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liability while other plan members are not.  To assuage current members’
concerns, it could be pointed out that all members will likely benefit
from the multiemployer health plan by attracting new employer-members
and increasing contributions to the plan.
In sum, PPACA will likely have many divergent effects upon mul-
tiemployer health benefit plans, both predictable and unpredictable.  In
addition to the excise tax for high-cost multiemployer health benefit
plans starting in 2018, other significant issues that multiemployer benefit
plans must consider include: how to maintain grandfathered plan status,
becoming self-funded to retain discretion over health benefits offered to
members, and the use of withdrawal liability agreements to lure new em-
ployers to join multiemployer health plans rather than letting these em-
ployers direct their employees to the health benefit exchanges for
coverage.  Assuming PPACA is constitutional,164 multiemployer health
plans will need to remain vigilant on all of these issues to ensure provi-
sion of health care benefits to union members on a cost-effective basis.
IV. THE JUDICIAL CHALLENGE TO MULTIEMPLOYER PENSION AND
HEALTH PLANS
Nonetheless, all is not well with the judicial interpretation of ERISA
provisions relating to multiemployer benefit plans.  Indeed, when consid-
ering Section 302(c)(5) of the Taft–Hartley Act of 1947, matters become
even more convoluted and difficult for plan administrators and trustees to
follow.  The basic problem stems from the often vague and expansive
language used in both ERISA and Section 302(c)(5).  As a result, the
United States Supreme Court and lower federal courts have struggled
over numerous, significant issues involving multiemployer health and
pension plans.165
Although this law continues to shift as successive courts, and even
different United States Supreme Courts, interpret these laws in diverse
ways; a number of important insights can still be garnered by considering
just one representative area: the standard of review for a multiemployer
benefit plan’s denial of a claim by a participant or beneficiary to certain
pension or health benefits.  Consideration of this issue provides another
cautionary tale to multiemployer plans and their trustees on best practices
164 Currently, the district courts are divided 3–2 in favor of upholding PPACA as a consti-
tutional exercise of Congressional authority. Compare Mead vs. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16
(D.D.C. 2011) (declaring PPACA individual mandate constitutional) with Florida ex rel. Bondi
v. U.S. Dept. of Health &Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011)
(striking down the entire PPACA as unconstitutional).
165 See, e.g., Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 223 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., concur-
ring) (arguing that “fresh consideration of the availability of consequential damages under
[ERISA] § 502(a)(3) is plainly in order.”).
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in avoiding unnecessary litigation and the potential liability for fiduciary
breaches.
A. Denial of Benefit Claims Under ERISA
ERISA Section 502(a)(1)(B) claims are instituted to recover bene-
fits, to enforce rights under the plan, or to clarify rights to future bene-
fits.166  Claims for benefits are by far the most common legal action
brought under ERISA.167  A plan participant or beneficiary may bring
such a suit, against the plan, for the value of the denied benefits or
rights.168
For instance, if a plan participant wishes to receive full hospital bed-
rest for a high-risk pregnancy, and the plan administrator denies the
claim, the participant may file a claim against the plan for only the value
of that bed-rest, not for the damages associated with loss of the baby.169
Significantly, compensatory and punitive damages are not available
under Section 502(a)(1)(B).170  Moreover, because of the strong preemp-
tive effect of ERISA on contrary state laws,171 most of the time ERISA
participants and beneficiaries will not receive consequential relief under
state law.172
These denials of benefit claims are also difficult to win for ERISA
plaintiffs because, before bringing a Section 502(a)(1)(B) claim in state
or federal court, a plan participant must exhaust her internal claim reme-
dies.173  Once the plan administrator has denied a claim, the plan partici-
pant must file an appeal with the administrator, wait for a further adverse
166 ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B).
167 See generally, RICHARD A. BALES, JEFFREY M. HIRSCH, & PAUL M. SECUNDA, UNDER-
STANDING EMPLOYMENT LAW 226 (2007).
168 See Paul M. Secunda, Sorry No Remedy: Intersectionality and the Grand Irony of
ERISA, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 131, 146 (2009).
169 See Corcoran v. United Health Ins., Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that
the plaintiffs who lost their baby could only recover for the difference between the services
actually rendered and the services that should have been received, not for the wrongful death
of the child).
170 See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144 (1985) (“Section
502(a)(1)(B) . . . says nothing about the recovery of extracontractual damages, or about the
possible consequences of delay in the plan administrators’ processing of a disputed claim.”).
171 See Secunda, supra note 168, at 133 (maintaining that, “[c]ourts broadly interpret the
preemption provisions of ERISA under section 514 to invalidate benefits-related state laws and
then force employees to depend on an inadequate, ‘comprehensive and reticulated’ remedial
scheme under section 502(a)”).
172 See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52 (1987) (finding that Mississippi
common law claims for tort, contract, and bad faith were preempted by ERISA). See also
Secunda, supra note 168, at 169–70 (recommending that Congress pass an ERISA Civil Rights
Act to provide consequential relief in ERISA cases where “reinstatement, back pay, and other
equitable ‘make-whole relief’ is insufficient to provide adequate relief caused by denials of
benefits.”).
173 ERISA § 503; 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(2010).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\21-1\CJP111.txt unknown Seq: 27 13-OCT-11 11:15
2011] THE FORGOTTEN EMPLOYEE 103
determination, and exhaust all internal claims procedures before bringing
her benefit claim in state or federal court.174  At that point, the issue then
becomes the appropriate judicial standard of review to employ when ex-
amining the plan administrator’s benefit determination.175
In 1989, in Firestone Tire & Rubber Company v. Bruch,176 the
United States Supreme Court directed review of the benefit decision
under a very deferential arbitrary and capricious standard when the plan
vests the administrator with discretion to make such decisions.177  More
recently, under Metropolitan Life v. Glenn,178 a conflict of interest may
exist where the plan both determines whether a qualified benefit claim
exists and is also responsible for paying that claim.179  If such a conflict
of interest exists, that conflict must have weight in deciding whether the
plan administrator’s determination was arbitrary or capricious.180  The
question then becomes how much weight to give such a conflict of
interest.
B. Inherently Conflicted Multiemployer Plans
A recent case by the Second Circuit, Durakovic v. Building Services
32 BJ Pension Fund,181 explored this exact issue in which a self-insured
multiemployer plan182 denied a claimed benefit to a participant or benefi-
ciary of the plan.  More specifically, Durakovic involved an office
cleaner who suffered chronic pain and weakness following an automo-
bile accident, and applied for, and was denied disability benefits from her
union’s multiemployer plan.183
In support of her disability claim, Durakovic submitted the reports
of two of her physicians, the finding of the Social Security Administra-
174 ERISA § 503; 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (2010).
175 See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 114–16 (1989) (holding
provision of plan contract is to be reviewed under de novo standard unless benefit plan gives
administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to
construe terms of plan).
176 Id.
177 Id. at 115.
178 554 U.S. 105 (2008).
179 Id. at 108 (“We here decide that this dual role [of the plan insurer] creates a conflict of
interest.”).
180 Id. (“[A] reviewing court should consider th[e] conflict as a factor in determining
whether the plan administrator has abused its discretion in denying benefits; and . . . the signif-
icance of the factor will depend upon the circumstances of the particular case.”).
181 609 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2010).
182 Most multiemployer health plans are now self-funded. See supra note 153 and accom-
panying text. See also Kaiser Family Foundation, Employer Health Benefits 2010 Annual
Survey, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, 154, available at http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/2010/8085.pdf
(noting the percentage of workers in self-funded plans is now 59% and “[e]ighty percent of
covered workers in firms with 1,000 to 4,999 workers and 93% of covered workers in firms
with 5,000 or more workers are in self-funded plans in 2010.”).
183 Durakovic, 609 F.3d at 135.
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tion that she was disabled, and the report of a vocational expert.184  The
multiemployer plan required her to go to two different “independent”
physicians and to their own vocational expert.185  Significantly, in deny-
ing her claim, the plan did not mention any of the evidence submitted by
Durakovic, but relied solely on their own experts.186  After exhausting all
of the necessary internal appeal procedures, she filed suit in federal court
under Section 502 (a)(1)(B).187
The court began its analysis by finding that the arbitrary and capri-
cious standard of review under Firestone was the appropriate standard
for reviewing the plan’s determination.188  Moreover, because this case
involved a situation where the “ERISA-fund administrator . . . ‘both
evaluates claims for benefits and pays benefits claims,’” the plan was
considered conflicted, and therefore, under Metropolitan Life v. Glenn,
the district court was required to “weigh the conflict as a factor in its
analysis.”189
The Second Circuit disagreed with the district court that the pres-
ence of the conflict was a “relatively unimportant one.”190  Instead, the
court emphasized the multiemployer organization of the fund, and con-
cluded that multiemployer plans are inherently conflicted under Glenn
when making benefit decisions.191  It reasoned that because trustee
boards made up of equal numbers of union and employer representatives
administer Taft–Hartley plans,192 they suffer from board members with
conflicting loyalties.193  Although trustees have fiduciary interests that
weigh in favor of participants and beneficiaries of the plan, they also
tend to have interests that favor the employer over these employees.194
For instance, by rejecting meritorious benefit claims, plan trustees, loyal
to the company, will help reduce future employer contributions to the
plan.195  To protect against such conflicts infecting the claim determina-
tion process, the court, relying on language from Glenn, suggested that
appropriate procedural safeguards could include: (1) walling off claims
184 Id. at 135–136.
185 Id. at 135–137.
186 Id. at 136–37.
187 Id. at 137.
188 Id. at 137–138.
189 Id. at 138. See also Metro. Life v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 (2008).
190 Durakovic, 609 F.3d at 138–40.
191 Id. at 139–40.
192 29 U.SC. § 186(c)(5) (2006).
193 Durakovic, 609 F.3d at 139 (“The employer representatives have fiduciary interests
that weigh in favor of the trusts’ beneficiaries on the one hand, but representational and other
interests that weigh to the contrary . . . .  That the board is (by requirement of statute) evenly
balanced between union and employer does not negate the conflict.”) (citations omitted).
194 Id.
195 Id. (“The rejection of claims will reduce future employer contributions.”) (citing Hol-
land v. Int’l Paper Co. Ret. Plan, 576 F.3d 240, 249 (5th Cir.2009)).
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administrators from those interested in firm finances; and (2) imposing
management checks that penalize inaccurate decision-making irrespec-
tive of whom the inaccuracies benefit.196
The court therefore rejected the plan’s contention that it was not
conflicted because it was composed of equal members from management
and labor,197 though it agreed that the presence of union representatives
should be considered in deciding how severe the conflict is in any
case.198  In this vein, the court found that the weight accorded to any
conflict should vary in direct proportion to the likelihood that the conflict
affected the benefits decision.199  In Durakovic, because there were no
procedural safeguards in place to protect against the inherent conflict of
interest, and because the plan did not consider any of the plaintiff’s evi-
dence as far as her ability to continue to work, the decision to find the
plan’s determination arbitrary and capricious was straightforward.200
All of this is not to say that plan trustees may not deny a claim in
good faith because a claim is simply not meritorious.  But given this
inherently conflicted legal standard, plan trustees and their advisors will
now need to do double-diligence when denying claims and make sure
“substantial evidence” exists for the claim decision.201  Plans and their
trustees will need to have a comprehensive paper trail, set up procedural
safeguards to mitigate conflicts, and make certain to consider and men-
tion all evidence submitted by the parties.
In fact, in addition to approaching denial of benefit issues with the
necessary caution, multiemployer plans and their trustees need to remain
mindful of the ever-changing legal landscape in this area of the law.  Ju-
dicial interpretations will also have significant impact in areas as diverse
as the recovery of delinquent employer contributions,202 standards for
196 See Metro. Life v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 117 (2008).
197 Id.  But see Anderson v. Suburban Teamsters of N. Ill. Pens. Fund Bd. of Trs., 588
F.3d 641, 648 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The various participating employers-not the Trustees-fund the
Plan.  The Trustees have no personal economic interest in the decision to grant or deny bene-
fits.  Additionally, the Board of Trustees consists of both employer and employee representa-
tives, who determine employee eligibility under the Plan. Both sides are at the table.”).  This
line of reasoning in Anderson appears less persuasive than that in Durakovic because the Ninth
Circuit did not consider the fact that management trustees can have conflicting loyalties to
their employers, especially if denying a claim will lead to lower employer contributors from
their company. See supra notes 181–83 and accompanying text.
198 Durakovic, 609 F.3d at 141.
199 Id. at 139.
200 Id. at 142 (“Giving appropriate weight to the Glenn conflict, any rational trier of fact
would conclude that the Funds’ decision was unsupported by substantial evidence, and there-
fore arbitrary and capricious.”).
201 Id. at 141 (“Substantial evidence is such evidence that a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support the conclusion reached by the administrator and requires more than a
scintilla but less than a preponderance.”).
202 See, e.g., Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pens. Fund v. Gerber Truck Serv., Inc., 870
F.2d 1148 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (interpreting ERISA § 515 to bar employers from raising
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breach of fiduciary duty,203 and the imposition of withdrawal liability.204
Consequently, in addition to the financial and healthcare challenges fac-
ing multiemployer benefit plans, judicial challenges will also play a sub-
stantial role in determining the viability of these plans in the future.
CONCLUSION
Multiemployer benefit plans remain as important today as when the
Taft–Hartley Amendments first created them in 1947.  These plans con-
tinue to represent one of the great triumphs in American labor relations
by providing pension, health, and welfare benefits to union workers in
itinerant industries.  Because these plans are now under siege as a result
of financial, healthcare, and judicial developments, steps need to be
taken immediately to secure the dignity of the 10 million workers who
participate in the 1,500 multiemployer plans throughout the nation.
What is at stake is not merely the ability of these employees to receive
crucial employee benefits, but also the workforce stability that is engen-
dered in these itinerant industries as a result of the existence of such
multiemployer benefit plans.
This Article provides a first-time look at the numerous challenges
that face these multiemployer pension benefit plans in the post-global
recession and health care reform world of the United States.  By high-
lighting potential reform proposals and underscoring the dangers that
continue to threaten the very existence of these plans, this Article aims to
rejuvenate the discussion of how to make these benefit plans more finan-
cially sustainable in the future, and how to more effectively address the
impending legal conflicts that these plans will inevitably have to
confront.
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